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91-1538.ZS
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1993-11-06
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NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
SMITH v. UNITED STATES
certiorari to the united states court of appeals for
the ninth circuit
No. 91-1538. Argued December 7, 1992-Decided March 8, 1993
After her husband was killed in Antarctica-a sovereignless region
without civil tort law of its own-while he was working for a private
firm under contract to a federal agency, petitioner filed this wrongful
death action against the United States under the Federal Tort
Claims Act (FTCA). The District Court dismissed the complaint for
lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that the claim was barred
by the FTCA's foreign-country exception, which states that the
statute's waiver of sovereign immunity does not apply to ``[a]ny claim
arising in a foreign country,'' 28 U. S. C. 2680(k). The Court of
Appeals affirmed.
Held: The FTCA does not apply to tortious acts or omissions occurring
in Antarctica. The ordinary meaning of ``foreign country'' includes
Antarctica, even though it has no recognized government. If this
were not so, 1346(b)-which waives sovereign immunity for certain
torts committed ``under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable . . . in accordance with the law of the
place where the act or omission occurred'' (emphasis added)-would
have the bizarre result of instructing courts to look to the law of a
place that has no law in order to determine the United States'
liability. Similarly, if Antarctica were included within the FTCA's
coverage, 1402(b)-which provides that claims may be brought ``only
in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act
or omission complained of occurred''-would have the anomalous
result of limiting venue to cases in which the claimant happened to
reside in the United States, since no federal judicial district
encompasses Antarctica. This interpretation of the FTCA accords
with the canon of construction that prohibits courts from either
extending or narrowing the statute's sovereign immunity waiver
beyond what Congress intended, United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S.
111, 117-118, and with the presumption against extraterritorial
application of United States statutes, see, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian
American Oil Co., 499 U. S. ___, ___. It is unlikely that Congress,
had it expressly considered the question when it passed the FTCA,
would have included a desolate and extraordinarily dangerous land
such as Antarctica within the statute's scope. Pp. 3-8.
953 F. 2d 1116, affirmed.
Rehnquist, C. J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White,
Blackmun, O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and Thomas, JJ.,
joined. Stevens, J., filed a dissenting opinion.